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In addition to these characteristics of rural areas of Bangladesh which contribute 
to high intermediation costs, policies such as reserve requirements, interest rate 
controls, and credit allocation that are designed to achieve certain economic objectives 
can also increase intermediation costs. Rediscounting is commonly used to subsidize 
rural credit and partly to offset the higher costs resulting from other policy instruments. 
Estimation of the cost function is expected to shed light on the size and product 
mix of bank branches, an important issue in rural banking in Bangladesh. The cost- or 
supply-side benefits result from spreading fixed costs over an expanded output scale as 
well as product mix and reuse of information. Economies of scale and scope, 
however, are only one determinant of the size and structure of banking. In a small, 
densely-populated country as Bangladesh, risk considerations, market size, customer 
cost economies, and regulatory restrictions are equally important in determining branch 
size and location. On the one hand, scale economies may dictate further expansion of 
bank branches while, on the other hand, limited market size or location in a remote area 
may suggest that the branch is already of optimal size. Moreover, banks may jointly 
produce different outputs because of joint demand on the part of users, even if such 
production has no cost advantages for the bank or even if it has some disadvantages. 
This study captures the cost- or supply-side benefits from banking, but neglects the 
revenue- or demand-side benefits. Thus the total economies from joint production may 
be understated. 
Previous studies of bank costs and viability have focused on the nonfinancial 
costs incurred by financial institutions. The latter approach, termed the "production 
approach" is appropriate for answering questions regarding the operational efficiency of 
banks. However, it has severe limitations in evaluating the viability of banks, since 
interest expenses are ignored in the estimation of the cost function. As a result, cost 
properties such as economies of scale and scope may be biased. 
This paper proposes to use an alternative approach, the "intermediation 
approach", to examine the economic viabilify of a sample of rural bank branches in 
Bangladesh. Financial as well as nonfinancial costs incUITed by banks are considered 
and the resulting cost characteristics are compared with those obtained from the 
traditional approach. The intermediation approach would adjust for any biases in scale 
and scope economy estimates due to differences in the size and mix of sources of funds 
across banks. The targeted funds disbursed under the special agricultural credit 
programs have dictated the patterns of somces and uses of funds for rural bank 
branches, especially during the past decade. These programs frequently exceed the 
resomces that the banks generate via deposit mobilization and, therefore, require central 
bank refinance to suppon the programs. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the 
loan repayment situation is bad, and getting worse. The deterioration in loan quality 
has exacerbated the liquidity problem and considerably reduced the flexibility with 
which financial intermediaries operate. 
This paper begins with a brief discussion of key regulatory policies influencing 
rural banking in Bangladesh. The second section describes the model, definition of 
variables, and data used in the study. The third section presents some empirical results 
for intermediation costs and the fourth section summarizes the impact of the loan 
recovery problem on rural banking. The final section identifies some policy issues 
which arise from this research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The movement during the past decade, towards development of banking 
systems in the rural areas of Bangladesh has raised questions concerning the long-run 
viability of these institutions. The issue of viability of rural bank branches is 
complicated to analyze. Most discussions of viability in banking in Bangladesh center 
around meeting national objectives. At the national or policy making level, banks have 
been perceived as playing a role in furthering social objectives. Much emphasis has 
been placed in Bangladesh on the targeted lending programs of the rural bank branches 
as an induced use of resources to the benefit of the nation. An implicit objective has 
been to improve access to financial services in the rural areas. There are important 
trade-offs involved in operating a network of small, high-cost rural bank branches on 
the one hand, and reductions in customer transaction costs on the other. While the 
social benefits of the system have been emphasized, there is hardly any information 
pertaining to the costs and efficiency of the banking network. 
This paper presents an estimate of the costs involved in rural banking in 
Bangladesh. Two alternative approaches are used to estimate costs: the production and 
intermediation approaches, which focus on operating efficiency and economic viability, 
respectively. This study deals with a number of issues relating to bank viability: Are 
the margins authorized for financial institutions sufficient to cover costs? Are the level 
of subsidies required to support institutions too large to be sustained by the 
government? Are there economies of scale in financial intermediation?. Are loan loss 
reserves and interest margins adequate to cover projected loan losses? What is the 
impact of the poor loan recovery situation on the future viability of bank branches? An 
important objective for the financial sector should be a steady decline in intermediation 
costs so interest rates charged to borrowers are decreased and returns to savers are 
increased. 
Several factors contribute to high financial intermediation costs in rural areas of 
Bangladesh. Rural infrastructure is poor so transportation and communication costs are 
high for financial institutions, for depositors, and for borrowers. Often, supporting 
systems and institutions are weak or nonexistent so information costs are high when 
lenders seek to determine land ownership, verify financial statements, ascertain credit 
worthiness, etc. Lending risks are also high because agricultural price policies, input 
supplies and marketing systems are underdeveloped for farmer borrowers. Deposit and 
loan sizes are frequently small so it is difficult to achieve the productivity of large 
account volumes per bank officer. 
t The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
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RURAL BANKING IN BANGLADESH 
The rural financial system in Bangladesh is dominated by the four nationalized 
commercial banks (NCBs) - Agrani, Janata, Rupali, Sonali - and the agricultural 
development bank, Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB). The NCBs are active both in 
lending and deposit mobilization, and have branches throughout the country. BKB, on 
the other hand, specializ.es in agricultural lending (although it does accept deposits), and 
is confined to the rural areas. Sonali Bank is the largest of the NCBs. In addition to its 
normal banking functions, it also provides treasury and banking services for the 
government and for public enterprises. As of June 1986, the NCBs controlled 63 
percent of the gross assets in the monetary system. Furthermore, they mobilized an 
average of 80 percent of total deposits and provided 64 percent of total advances. 
Branching Policies 
Among the several policies that have been used to shape the direction of the 
financial policies and control its activities, the branching policies of the Bangladesh 
Bank (the central bank) probably have the greatest influence on the rural operations of 
the NCBs and BKB. From 1977 until 1981, a "two-for-one" branching policy was in 
effect which required commercial banks to open two new rural branches for each new 
urban branch licensed. As a result, the number of rural bank branches increased nearly 
three-fold from 1977 until 1982. It has been argued that the rural branch expansion 
was intended to serve as a conduit for the allocation of agricultural credit to target 
groups. The policy may also have had the effect of reducing customer-incurred 
transaction costs in the rural areas and facilitated deposit mobilization (Meyer, Khalily 
and Hushak). The average population per bank branch declined from 39,961 
inhabitants per branch in 1977 to 19,927 inhabitants per branch in 1987 (Ahmed). 
Deposit potential and level of banking competition appear to have been important 
factors in determining the licensing of specific branches. 
However, the economic viability of these branches is open to question. In a 
branch banking system, it is possible that a rural branch, although uneconomical in its 
own operations, becomes profitable to the bank because of income earned from a more 
lucrative urban branch under the two-for-one policy. If this is true, it is possible that 
the demand for rural branches will fall once the choicest urban locations are exhausted. 
The slowdown in expansion of rural branches after the termination of the "two-for-one" 
policy in 1981 suggests that this may have occurred. The withdrawal of the two 
recently denationalized banks from rural areas and the transfer of some NCB rural 
branches to BKB in recent years may have represented an attempt by banks to rid 
themselves of the unprofitable operations that emerged because of this policy. 
Interest Rate Policy 
Deposit rate ceilings have remained in effect since nationalization and have 
undergone major changes only three times (1974, 1976, and 1980).1 Although the 
deposit rate has been slightly higher in rural branches than urban branches, much of the 
time the weighted average deposit rate has been negative in real terms. There were two 
major changes (1980 and 1983) in interest rate ceilings on loans and advances. The 
1 See table 1 in Meyer, Khalily and Hushak. 
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revision in 1980 set the lowest ceiling at 12 percent (on agricultural advances) and the 
highest at 15.5 percent (on general advances). The other major change in 1983 added a 
4 percent service charge to agricultural lending. Currently, the rate on general lending 
is around 20 percent. Thus the interest rate authorized for rural loans has often been set 
lower than the rate authorized for loans to other sectors. With higher deposit rates and 
lower loan rates, the spread between deposit and lending rates is generally less 
favorable for rural than urban branches. 
There are two implications of this interest rate structure. First, it is a 
disincentive for branches to aggressively mobilize rural deposits for rural lending. 
Second, if this rate structure does not cover operating costs, banks must subsidize rural 
operations with more profitable urban operations. 
Refinance Policy 
Lending rate policies are closely related to the refinance policies of the 
Bangladesh Bank. The stated objectives of refinance have been to (i) subsidize losses 
of public enterprises, (ii) provide resources to specialized institutions, (iii) 
accommodate seasonal fluctuations in demand for credit, and (iv) subsidize losses 
incurred by NCBs in lending to priority sectors (World Bank). The rural banking 
system has been the main beneficiary of this policy. Perhaps this policy was intended 
to offset the disincentives of higher deposit rates on rural deposits and lower lending 
rates on rural loans. For instance, during the early 1980s, rural credit could be 
refinanced up to a maximum of 50 percent of loans made (100 percent for BKB) at an 
interest rate of 6 percent with a maximum lending rate of 12 percent At the same time, 
the weighted average bank interest rate paid on all deposits was 7 to 7 .5 percent. Thus 
it was logical for the banks to mobilize rural deposits for urban lending and use 
refinance funds rather than deposits for rural lending. A variable rate policy for 
refinancing agricultural loans was adopted in 1983. The refinance rate now ranges 
from 7.5-10.5 percent and the cost of refinance is higher for,,the NCBs than for BKB. 
As will be shown later, the use of the intermediation approach to measuring bank costs 
and output is expected to capture differences in sources of funds across bank branches. 
Table 1 shows the trends in sources of funds going into agricultural credit 
during 197 5 to 1987. Use of the refinancing facility of the Bangladesh Bank increased 
rapidly from 1977 with the introduction of the Tk 100 crore Special Agricultural Credit 
Program. Net refinance as a percentage of total disbursement peaked at 42 percent in 
1983. It has been argued that usage of refinance entitlements by banks is largely a 
function of credit ceilings, interest rates, net return on investments, and liquidity 
constraints of financial institutions (Virmani). As of June 1985, rural credit accounted 
for 72 percent of the total refinance outstanding with the Bangladesh Bank. There was 
considerable variation in refinance use over time, but Sonali and BKB accounted for 
over 80 percent of the total refinance outstanding on agricultural credit with the 
Bangladesh Bank in 1986. 
Loan Targeting 
Rediscounting is closely related to the loan targeting policies of the Bangladesh 
Bank. The central bank. at one point in time, operated as many as 60 specialized credit 
programs in the rural sector. These programs are crop-specific (e.g. bananas or jute), 
activity-specific (e.g. irrigation projects), or client-specific (e.g. women). To some 
5 
extent, this plethora of programs reflects the particular concerns or priorities of the 
donor agencies which finance them. 
Not all programs are offered through all bank branches; as a result, some 
borrowers must apply for financing from more than one bank to address their full credit 
needs. This lack of one-stop shopping for banking services is time consuming for 
borrowers and compounds the problems of the banks in trying to ascertain a 
boITOwer's current indebtedness. Finally, from an efficiency perspective, both 
borrowers and lenders alike are burdened with additional paperwork. All bank 
branches are required to submit reports on loan disbursements and recoveries by target 
group and/or loan pmpose to the head offices and the Bangladesh Bank. This reporting 
system can impose large costs on banks. The apparently "cheap" funds available from 
international sources have turned out to be expensive for financial institutions to 
administer in several other countries. This may also turn out to be the case in 
Bangladesh. 
MODEL AND METIIODS 
The model and methods used in this paper generally follow the approach 
described in Cuevas. Basically the procedure used was to estimate a translog cost 
function for a sample of rural bank branches. Costs are assumed to be dependent on 
output levels and input prices. The general form of the translog can be written as 
follows, 
m n mm 
Inc= Clo+ LCii In qi+ L ~j lnpj +Yi LL 'Yikln qiln qk 
i=l j=l i=lk=l 
n n m n 
+Yi LL A.jsln Pj In Ps +LL aijln qiln Pj (1) 
j=l s=l i=l j=l 
where qi is the quantity of the ith output, Pj is the price of the jth input, and In denotes 
natural logarithm. It is possible to derive a system of cost-share equations directly from 
the translog cost function by differentiating (1) with respect to Pj• 
M·=pjxj=dlnC 
J C a In Pj 
n m 
or Mj = ~j + L A.jsln Ps + L aijln qi (2) 
s=l i=l 
where Mj is the cost share of the jth input. 
From this cost function, economically interesting properties can be derived. 
Some of these properties are briefly described below. To fully understand the nature of 
size-related economies in banking, changes in costs due to proportionate and 
disproportionate increases in output quantities, and changes in cost due to simultaneous 
production of several different outputs in a single bank must be considered. While 
economies of scale addresses the former issue, economies of scope addresses the latter. 
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There are two measures of multiproduct economies of scale at the bank branch 
level: overall and product-specific. The overall measure of scale economies is of the 
form, 
m m m m n 
or s = I ai + I I 'Yik 1n qk + I I e ij 1n P j c3) 
i=l i=l k=l i=l j=l 
Values of S less than one imply increasing returns to scale (Murray and White). 
Another type of scale economy stems from variation in the output of one 
product, holding constant the quantities of other products. Product-specific economies 
of scale Si, are defined as the marginal cost of producing a particular product divided 
by the average incremental cost of its production (Mester), 
ac/ 
/aqi 
s i = (C(Q) - C(Q_J) I 
/qi 
(4) 
where, Qi is the output vector with a zero replacing the quantity of the ith output. If Si 
is less than one, then product-specific scale economies exist. 
There are several important properties that relate to the mix of output among 
different products. For the purposes of this paper, economies of scope are 
emphasized. Economies of scope are said to exist if joint production of m products by 
one firm is less costly than the combined costs of production of m specialty firms. This 
implies cost savings from joint production. Economies of scope and cost 
complementarities in production arise from inputs that are shared jointly without 
complete congestion. Economies of scope exist between qi and qk if, _, 
C(qi, qk) < C(qi, 0) + C(O, q0 
The Willig index of scope economies (Panzar and Willig) measures the percentage 
reduction in costs due to joint production, and is of the form, 
SC= ( C(qi, 0) + C(O, q0 - C(qi, q0) I C(qi, q0 (5) 
Since the translog cost function is undefined at zero output levels, SC and Si were 
approximated by substituting 10 percent of the sample mean where qi = 0, and using 
mean values for all other variables in computing the cost function (1). Economies of 
scope are increasing, constant or decreasing as SC is greater than, equal to, or less than 
zero. 
At the micro level several policies are designed to achieve scale economies in 
Bangladesh. The two-for-one licensing policy resulted in the proliferation of numerous 
small bank branches in the rural areas. Banlcs may have opened new branches before 
exhausting economies of scale at existing branches for reasons discussed earlier, i.e., 
limited market size, location in remote areas, or regulatory restrictions. A wider 
network of branches has improved access and convenience to bank customers. 
Convenience and economies of scale interact in a way that makes efficiency consistent 
with a range of branch sizes and considerable variety in the extent of branching. Since 
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BKB does not have as strong a tradition of deposit mobilization as the other banks it 
was expected that BKB would exhibit economies of scale in deposit mobilization, while 
the NCBs would be characterized by economies in lending. 
There is evidence of excess capacity among bank branches in the rural areas of 
Bangladesh (World Bank). If these branches are considering producing new financial 
services, this possibility may be enhanced by the existence of scope economies in the 
overall cost function. This is because the incremental cost of prc~:lucing the second set 
of financial services will be less than that for a specialty firm. Further, knowledge of 
cost complementarities may give insights as to how the bank can appropriately change 
its output mix in response to a change in demand for its products. Scope economies are 
expected to be more pronounced in BKB due to greater emphasis placed on lending. 
Definition of Variables 
The definitions used to measure bank output and costs have changed 
considerably as the literature on bank costs has developed over the past twenty years. 
The estimation of the cost function is particularly sensitive to the definition of output of 
banking institutions (Gilbert). Outputs which have been used in various studies 
include: value of total assets, earning assets, total deposits, demand deposits; number 
of deposit and loan accounts; gross operating income; and/or a combination of these. 
Another important specification issue is the definition of the dependent variable, 
cost. Should the cost variable associated with the output metric chosen include only 
operating costs (Cuevas; Gilligan, Smirlock and Marshall), or should it include both 
operating and interest costs (Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey; Lawrence and Shay)? 
These choices yield several specification combinations. Most authors reduce this set of 
alternatives down to one or two from which to generalize the banking industry. 
This study evaluated the robustness of cost properties (scale and scope 
economies) across alternative specifications of bank costs and output metrics. The 
measures are estimated using two ways of measuring bank outputs and costs i.e., 
production vs. intermediation approach. The number of output-cost configurations is 
reducing by tying the choice of which bank costs to include to the metric chosen for 
bank output. Under the production approach, banks incur labor and capital costs by 
producing loan and deposit accounts of various sizes. Operating (nonfinancial) costs 
are specified in the cost function, and number of accounts are used as the output metric, 
while average account sizes are specified to control for other account characteristics 
(Kolari and Zardkoohi). Under the intermediation approach, banks intermediate 
deposits and other borrowings into loans and other assets. Total operating plus interest 
costs are specified and value of loans and deposits measured in takas are the output 
metric (Sealey and Lindley).2 
The remaining two combinations of output and cost are less appealing. First, 
output may be measured in takas while only operating costs are used in C. The 
drawback of this approach is that a branch can appear to have achieved impressive scale 
economies merely by using borrowed funds to fund a larger asset portfolio. Moreover 
2 Taka is the unit of Bangladeshi currency, where TK 25 = $1 during the period under study. 
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if these borrowed funds are another branch's deposits, the exclusion of interest costs 
hides operating costs incurred at another branch. Second, output could be measured as 
numbers of accounts and costs could include both interest and operating expenses. A 
problem with this approach is that the loan outputs into which the takas obtained in 
exchange for interest are transformed should also be measured in terms of takas, not 
number of accounts.3 
Under both approaches, the value-added criterion is used to determine which of 
the bank liability and asset categories should be treated as bank outputs. For instance, 
funds borrowed from the head office entail almost no operating expenses or value 
added, and so are treated as intermediate inputs with interest costs only. Deposits, on 
the other hand, are treated as outputs since considerable value added is entailed in the 
form of safekeeping, liquidity, and payments services to depositors. The maintained 
assumption is that borrowed funds entail no scale or scope economies. The issue of 
deposit-mobilization versus borrowing is especially relevant in Bangladesh because of 
the importance of loan targeting and credit allocation programs in agriculture. 
The appropriate choice between the two approaches depends on the question 
being asked. The production approach appears to be useful for answering questions 
about the operational efficiency of banks. However, for questions related to the 
economic viability of banks, the intermediation approach is preferred because it is more 
inclusive of the total costs of banking. The empirical results from applying the 
production approach may be termed "operating cost" scale and scope economies, and 
those from the intermediation approach may be called "total cost" scale and scope 
economies. 
Factor price definitions were common to both approaches. Two factors were 
considered, labor and capital. The price of labor services was measured as the annual 
average salary plus fringe benefits paid to bank employees divided by the total number 
of employees. The price of capital was measured by the sum of rents paid and 
depreciation divided by the value of loan and deposit balances. 
Data 
The focus of this study is a sample of 190 rural branches of the four 
nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) and the agricultural development bank, BKB. 
The data, consisting of income-expense statements on a semi-annual basis, were 
obtained for a period of two years - 1983 and 1984 - from the Bangladesh Bank. In 
addition, quarterly data were obtained on loans and deposits for the same set of 
branches over the same time period. These five institutions were selected for study 
because they participated in the USAID Rural Finance Project, and because they 
dominate the rural areas in terms of branches, lending, and deposit mobilization 
operations. The breakdown of the 190 branches by bank is as follows: Agrani - 40; 
Janata-44; Rupali - 19; Sonali - 46; and BKB -41. Proportionate sampling was 
used in the selection process. The population consisted of all rural branches of the five 
institutions. All variables were expressed in real terms using the World Bank rural 
consumer price index. 
3 The four possible combinations of output and costs produced average cost curves of roughly 
comparable shape when plotted using raw data. 
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Table 2 gives the mean values of the variables in the sample. Operating costs 
account for approximately half of total costs in Agrani, Janata, and Rupali. In contrast, 
interest expense constitutes a significant portion of total costs in Sonali and BKB. 
Nearly three-fourths of the total cost of BKB branches consists of interest payments on 
funds borrowed from the head office. Labor represents a far greater share of total costs 
than capital in all banks. The average size of a branch (measured by adding deposits 
and loans) is largest for Sonali and BKB compared to the other three banks, but the 
combination of assets and liabilities is quite different among the banks. Loans exceed 
deposits by a wide margin in BKB, they are roughly equal in Sonali, but deposits 
exceed loans in the remaining NCBs.4 Average deposit size is particularly small for 
BKB compared to the other banks, while average loan size is fairly similar for all the 
banks except Agrani. Under the maintained assumption that borrowed funds entail no 
scale or scope economies, the production approach would overestimate the economies 
of scale. The bias is expected to be more pronounced for BKB because of its heavy 
reliance on borrowed funds. s 
In the empirical section that follows, the same functional form is applied to the 
same data sets for the five banks for both the production and intermediation approaches 
to establish what, if any, are the qualitative differences between the results of the two 
approaches. Maximum-likelihood estimates were obtained by estimating the cost 
equation ( 1) and the labor share equation (2) using the iterative seemingly unrelated 
equations (SURE) technique. The share equation corresponding to capital was omitted. 
Restrictions implying homogeneity of degree one in input prices and symmetry were 
imposed. 
The banks were studied separately for two reasons. First, there is a priori 
evidence to suggest that there are managerial and operational differences among the 
banks. Second, statistical testing using dummy variables suggested that the differences 
among the banks were significant and warranted separate analysis. 
RESULTS 
Due to space considerations, the estimated parameters and t-ratios for the ten 
estimated equations (two for each bank) are not reported here.6 The R-square were 
reasonably high and most of the parameters were of the expected sign and were 
statistically significant. In general, the intennediation approach appeared to provide a 
better fit than the production approach, both in terms of R-square and the significance 
of individual coefficients. Using the estimated coefficients of the cost function, it is 
possible to investigate the production structure of the Bangladeshi banking system. 
4 Outstanding loans rather than disbursements are used in the value definition of loans. Loan recovery 
has been so slow that data on outstanding rural advances may greatly overstate actual loan 
disbursemenL 
S Caution is required in drawing many inferences from these data. These are mean values for a cross-
section of branches, and the distribution around the means were different among the banks. In 
particular, although on average Agrani, Janata, and Rupali branches appear to be net deposit mobilizers, 
there was considerable variation among branches in the loan/deposit ratio. In fact, since 1983 the 
overall rural deposit/rural loan ratio has been substantially less than one. 
6 For a full discussion of the results see Srinivasan. 
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Tables 3 show the overall scale economy measures and elasticity of output with 
respect to loans and deposits for the five banks under the production and intermediation 
approaches. In each case, scale economies are calculated at the geometric means of two 
deposit-size classes and the overall geometric mean to show how the economies or 
diseconomies vary with branch size. Use of the production approach suggests that the 
"average" Agrani and Rupali branches are in the constant returns to scale range, while 
operating cost scale economies appear to prevail in Janata, Sonali and BKB. A 10 
percent increase in the production of both outputs will generate increases in costs 
ranging from 6.8 percent (BKB) to 9.4 percent (Rupali). Under the intermediation 
approach, however, there are diseconomies of scale at all banks. Further, total cost 
diseconomies are most pronounced at BKB, which interestingly enough, also exhibited 
the highest cost advantage under the production approach. A comparable increase in 
output of 10 percent under the intermediation approach leads to a 16.6 percent increase 
in costs for BKB. 
There are two plausible explanations for this contrast First, as hypothesized, 
the production approach involves an innate bias towards economies of scale. Measured 
economies under the production approach are biased by a branch's choice of producing 
deposits or borrowing funds from the head office (in other words expanding the loan 
portfolio without expanding the deposit portfolio). The production approach may find 
more scale economies than appropriate as branches with larger loan portfolios employ a 
higher proportion of borrowed funds. This bias is more pronounced for BKB and is 
reflected in the estimates for overall scale economies under the two approaches. 
Interest expense on borrowed funds constitutes 41 percent of total costs in BKB 
compared with less than 25 percent in the three other banks for which data are available 
(Table 2). Intermediation approach scale economies are thus moderated by borrowings 
from the head office which have no scale economies by assumption. The other reason 
that scale economies may be more quickly exhausted in the intermediation approach is 
that smaller accounts cost more per taka and average account sizes decrease with 
numbers of accounts at the margin for both loans and deposits. 
As for variation in overall scale economies across size classes, 7 Sonali and 
BKB branches are too small to exhaust scale economies under the production approach, 
while Rupali branches of all sizes show constant returns to scale. Only Agrani and 
Janata branches exhibited U-shaped cost curves, with the curve flattening out in the TK 
1 - 1.5 million range. The results of the production approach taken in totality suggest 
that the smallest branches of all banks (except Rupali) may not be large enough to 
achieve full operating cost efficiency. However, this need not imply that small 
branches are not economically viable, since the production approach neglects interest 
expenses. 
Overall scale economy results for the small and large branch cases under the 
intermediation approach are also reponed in table 3. Contrary to the production 
approach, branches in even the smallest siz.e classes appear to be efficient As 
discussed above, there are two main reasons for this result. First, average account size 
tends to decrease with the number of accounts for both outputs and across size classes. 
As a result, scale economies are exhausted more quickly in the intermediation than in 
7 The scale economies were evaluated at the means of eight deposit size classes of which only two are 
reported here as the small and large branch cases. 
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the production approach, which holds average account size constant by assumption. 
The second reason is that all scale economies or diseconomies in operating plus regular 
interest costs are diluted by the inclusion of borrowed funds. 
The estimates obtained for output elasticities of cost with respect to loans and 
deposits (table 3) and product-specific scale economies (not reported here), indicate that 
economies of scale are relatively more pronounced in lending in the case of Agrani, 
Janata, Rupali banks. As expected, BKB and also Sonali showed increasing returns to 
deposit mobilization under both the production and intermediation approaches. 
The cost results in table 4 apply to an average bank branch which produces the 
geometric mean output vector and pays the geometric mean prices for factors of 
production. The shares of lending and deposit mobilization in total costs (fable 4, 
rows 1 and 2) are somewhat similar for Agrani, Janata, and Rupali banks across the 
two models. Sonali and BKB, however, with their relatively higher dependence on 
borrowed funds, show significantly higher shares for lending costs under the 
intermediation approach. The patterns observed here are consistent with Sonali and 
BKB's heavy reliance on refinance funds and greater participation in the loan targeting 
programs of the government Lower interest rates on rediscount funds relative to 
deposits act as a disincentive for mobilizing deposits. 
As expected. overall intermediation costs are higher under the intermediation 
approach in all cases, ranging from 7 percent to over 16 percent (rows 3-8). These 
numbers are estimates of the minimum interest rate that should be charged for the banks 
to break-even.s Only Sonali and BKB can break-even at the interest rate of 12 percent 
permitted on agricultural loans during the early 1980s. Note that the marginal costs of 
lending are higher than the marginal costs of deposit mobilization under both 
approaches. The marginal cost per loan account and per deposit account are increasing 
functions of loan-size and deposit-size, respectively. This finding is consistent with the 
data in table 2 that show average loan size is greater than the average size of a deposit 
account. 
There are interesting patterns in average costs across banks (table 4). The 
overall average and marginal costs of intermediation are lower for Sonali and BKB 
relative to the other banks. The higher overall average costs of Agrani, Janata, and 
Rupali banks appear to be the result of higher deposit mobilization costs. Sonali has 
pref erred access to some low cost deposits because of its treasury role, while BKB 
branches rely heavily on head office borrowing to fund their loan portfolios. It is 
generally believed that Sonali and BKB make a higher proportion of targeted loans than 
do other banks. In order to accelerate the loan disbursal process for special agricultural 
credit programs, commissions were set up to approve loans in the early 1980s. These 
commissions effectively removed bankers from the borrower selection process (Smith). 
Given the minimal involvement of branch personnel in disbursing and recovering these 
targeted loans, the low lending costs in Sonali and BKB are not surprising. In fact, it 
can be concluded that these costs are "too low". A note of caution is that risk costs are 
not considered so the above analysis does not imply that targeted agricultural loans are 
"less costly" than other types of loans. 
8 These estimates exclude provisions for bad debt, and implicitly asswne that all loans made are 
recovered. 
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If scope economies are positive, it is more cost efficient to produce deposits and 
loans together rather than to split into two firms, one producing deposits alone and the 
other producing loans. Agrani and Sonali banks display diseconomies of scope under 
both approaches, i.e., they would benefit by splitting their loan activities from their 
deposit activities (table 4, row 9). The estimate for Agrani bank can be interpreted as 
follows: the bank's costs are 43 percent higher under the production approach if it 
increases output using an optimal mix of any particular combination of outputs, as 
compared to increasing the bank's total output (deposits plus loans) by increasing each 
of the bank's products one at a time (from 10 percent of the overall sample mean). 
BKB is the only bank to show significant scope economies under both approaches with 
cost savings of over 20 percent, while Janata and Rupali exhibit economies of scope 
under the production approach and diseconomies under the intermediation approach. 
The prevalence of scope diseconomies in Agrani and Sonali is unexpected 
because of regulatory constraints which force the banks to emphasize agricultural 
lending at the expense of other potentially profitable types of lending activity. Since 
economies of scope potentially arise from the sharing of ajoint input such as credit 
information collection, it is likely that minimum loan screening by bank branches in 
Bangladesh may result in absence of scope economies (Smith). The finding of scope 
diseconomies does not imply that there are no economic reasons for joint production. 
The results are consistent with product mix and output costs being influenced by 
nonmeasured customer convenience and joint demand for bank outputs and portfolio 
risk considerations, rather than being driven solely by bank cost considerations. 
To summarize, this section presented findings on cost characteristics of the five 
banks using two approaches to measure banks costs and output: the production and 
intermediation approaches. Some of the measures were significantly different between 
the two mcxlels, suggesting that use of the production approach alone may lead to 
biased and misleading policy conclusions. However, the estimates did not reflect risk 
costs. The impact of loan default on bank viability is evaluated in the next section. 
LOAN DELINQUENCY, BANK COSTS AND BANK VIABILITY 
Some research has been conducted on loan delinquency in Bangladesh 
(Cookson; Gregory and Adams; and ODonnell) and a consensus emerged that the 
repayment situation of loans made by rural branches was bad, and getting worse. 
Because of the seriousness of this problem in Bangladesh, the impact of the loan 
recovery problem on the results of this study must be evaluated. Unfortunately, data 
on loan recovery were not available in a form that could be directly incorporated into the 
analysis. Therefore, analysis of loan recovery relied on results from studies that were 
conducted using a subset of the bank cost data and bank-level analysis. 
Two points should be noted at the outset (Meyer and Srinivasan). First, the 
resource costs (labor, capital, materials) incurred by bank branches in all aspects of 
loan monitoring, loan collection, legal processes to recover bad debts, etc. were 
included in the costs estimated above to the extent that they were adequately captured in 
the branch income-expense reports. Therefore, the cost of routine loan recovery efforts 
is included in the cost function estimates. Second, income from advances is reported 
on an accrued rather than a realized basis and there is no systematic policy for writing-
off bad debts of bank branches in Bangladesh. 
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The impact of loan delinquency on bank viability was evaluated by examining 
the percentage of the loan portfolio in arrears, constructing a loan recovery profile, and 
estimating the risk premium that must be charged for the branches to cover costs and 
break-even. The official recovery information for agricultural loans is reported in table 
5. It should be noted that this measurement has its limitations: it combines flow 
figures, current recoveries and dues, with a stock figure, past overdues. Table 5 
shows the arrears problem to be very severe with 75 percent of the loans due in 
1985/86 in arrears. On a national scale the trend of overdues in agricultural loans 
improved until 1981/1982 and has since been deteriorating. Gregory and Adams 
analyzed loan recovery for a sample of short-term agricultural loans made in 1979 to 
1984 and found that in total only 45 percent of the original principal had been 
recovered, as of March 1986. The recovery performance of individual banks in the 
sample followed a downward trend, mirroring the official recovery position. 
To clarify trends in loan recovery, Meyer suggests an alternative approach to 
examining loan recovery - the concept of the loan recovery profile, and whether or not 
that profile had actually shifted downward in recent years. The loan recovery loan 
profile plots the relationship between time and the percentage of the loan principal 
repaid. A comparison of the loan recovery profile for loans made in various years will 
show if a lender is more or less successful in collecting loans made in one year versus 
another. This comparison will also suggest whether or not there is a change in 
borrower behavior regarding loan repayment. 
Figure 1 shows the loan recovery profile for 5,270 short-term agricultural loans 
made in 1979 - 1984. The best total recovery is for loans made in 1979. After more 
than five years past the due date, the cumulative proportion of principal repaid reached 
about 65 percent. The recovery profile for loans made in 1980, 1981, and 1982 is 
fairly similar in terms of speed of loan recovery. A sharp change in loan recovery 
profile appears to have occurred with loans made in 1983 and 1984. Three years after 
due date, only 42 percent of the principal was recovered for loans made in 1983. 
Likewise, the loan recovery profile two years after due date is much worse for loans 
made in 1984 compared to loans made in other years. If these trends continue, the 
percent of principal eventually recovered after five years for 1983 and 1984 loans may 
be far less than 60 percent. These data show that loan recovery for short-term loans 
has clearly deteriorated over time for these sample bank branches. The disruption of 
financial discipline that followed the interest forgiveness programs of 1984 and 1985 
may have contributed to reducing loan recovery performance for all loans made before 
and after that date (Rashid). 
Since many loans made by rural branches are not repaid, the transaction costs 
estimates reported represent the lower bound for the minimum interest spread required 
to cover costs. A more realistic estimate of the minimum interest spread required for 
unsubsidized operations implies the need for appropriate provisions for bad debts. A 
casual review of bank financial statements suggests that reserves for bad debts must be 
too low unless very optimistic estimates are made about improvements in loan 
recovery. 
Lee and Baker used a simple, but effective formula to accentuate the debilitating 
effects of defaults on a loan portfolio. They consider lending costs (t) to be given by: 
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t=f+k+r 
where f, k, and r represent cost of funds, administrative costs and risk premium, 
respectively. The risk premium is an ex ante risk cost or the premium required to 
induce the lender to lend in the face of risk. Default causes the lender to lose not only 
the uncollected principal and interest, but also the associated cost of funds, f, and 
administrative costs, k, incurred in servicing the loans that were never recovered. Thus 
the risk premium can be represented as: 
d 
r = 1 _ d (1 + f + k) 
where the default rate, d, is expressed in terms of the loan principal. Using a 
hypothetical f and k of 7 percent and 2 percent respectively, with a default rate of 0.5 
percent, they show lending costs to be 
t = 0.07 + 0.02 + 0.005 I 1-0.005 (1+0.07 + 0.02) = 0.0955 
The risk premium (0.55 percent) is greater than the default rate that generated it (0.5 
percent). With f and k at 7 percent and 2 percent respectively, t becomes 100 percent 
of the principal loaned when d reaches 45.5 percent. This threshold value is lower if f 
and k are higher. 
Administrative costs and cost of funds were substituted in the above formula to 
estimate the threshold default rate. Lending costs were obtained from Table 4 under the 
intermediation approach. Using the Lee-Baker formula the threshold or break-even 
value for the default rate ranges from 44.9 percent for Janata Bank to 47 .9 percent for 
BKB. That is, at a cost of funds plus administrative cost of 10.23 percent, total 
lending costs will be 100 percent of loans outstanding when the default rate reaches 
44.9 percent of loans outstanding in Janata Bank. An alternative interpretation is that at 
a 44.9 percent rate of default, the risk premium will be 89.8 percent of loans 
outstanding, i.e., the institution would have to charge a risk premium of 89.8 (double 
the default rate) to break-even. 
In conclusion, Lee and Baker point out that "this relationship makes default a 
destructive factor for the lender if it reaches any appreciable level". The structure and 
level of arrears experienced by all five banks in Bangladesh is clearly one that 
endangers their loan portfolios and results in the high levels of risk costs presented 
above. The intermediation approach suggested that spreads ranged from -4.8 percent to 
4.8 percent However, including the risk premium implies that the spreads would turn 
substantially negative in all banks. 
The implication of the poor loan recovery situation in Bangladesh is clear. The 
future viability of the bank branches surveyed will depend much more on loan recovery 
performance than on any fine-tuning of banking operations which reduces costs. It is 
impossible to raise interest margins enough to cover risk premiums of 85 to 90 percent. 
The costs of loan default swamp all other costs. The only way rural bank branches can 
remain operational is through huge subsidies provided to them either from the head 
offices of the banks or the government. At a minimum, these subsidies will equal 40 
percent of the value of short-term loans made. The subsidies, in effect, will flow 
through the banking system to those borrowers who convert their loans into grants by 
defaulting. 
• 15 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The primary objective of this study was to measure and analyze the costs in 
financial intermediation. Several cost characteristics such as overall and product-
specific scale economies, and scope economies were presented for a sample of rural 
branches of five Bangladeshi banks, using branch-level cost data for 1983 and 1984. 
All these measures were evaluated using two different approaches - production and 
intermediation - to measuring bank costs and output 
Some general conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, scale economies 
were found to be substantially different under the two approaches. From the operating 
efficiency point of view, the branches showed constant or increasing returns. 
However, branch expansion to achieve these scale economies could lead to an increase 
in intrabank flow of funds. On adjusting for interest costs, the same set of branches 
showed decreasing returns to scale, suggesting that expansion may not be economically 
viable. Second, elasticities of cost with respect to output and product-specific 
economies of scale suggest that expansion in the scale ef branch operations should be 
unbalanced. The results suggest that BKB and Sonali should expand deposits 
relatively more than loans, while the other three banks should expand loans relatively 
more than deposits. Third, BKB was the only bank to show significant scope 
economies with cost savings from joint production of loans and deposits of over 20 
percent. Finally, ignoring allowances for loan losses, only Sonali and BKB can break 
even at the interest rate of 12 percent that prevailed during the sample period. These 
results suggest that the profitability of rural branches is much less than the 5 to 6 
percent margin between weighted average deposit and lending rates reported for 
scheduled banks in 1983 and 1984.9 
These results suggest several implications for policy makers in Bangladesh and 
raise important issues that demand attention and future research: 
1. Loan recovery is the paramount rural finance challenge today. Failure to 
effectively improve loan recovery will require enormous bank subsidies that 
will probably sabotage the future expansion of efficient rural banking and 
lending. 
2. The banking policies pursued by the government have resulted in an expansion 
of branches, deposits mobilized and rural lending. Much remains to be done, 
however, to assure the profitability of these branches. The small scale of 
operations of many branches contributes to the relatively high costs of 
intermediation. The scale of operations may be small due to low volume of 
banking business or licensing policies of the Bangladesh Bank. Costs are 
probably high during the start-up phase of a new branch and decline as deposit 
and loan volumes increase. 
3. Economies of scale appear to suggest further expansion of bank branches. As 
discussed earlier, this analysis cannot predict whether or not expansion can 
easily occur with the current number and geographic distribution of bank 
branches in rural areas. While the number of rural branches increased rapid! y, 
9 As reported in Economic Trends, August 1985. 
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geographic coverage of the rural areas is still uneven. Rural branches are 
located in about half of the roughly 4,000 unions in the country, leaving a large 
part of the country still unbanked. 
4. Given the high default rates, the banks may be justified in not adjusting to the 
partial scale economies that appear to exist for lending. On the other hand, if 
banks are to expand their lending operations, adequately supervise the loans, 
and conduct effective loan recovery, an increase in administrative costs appears 
inevitable. 
5. The current technology for managing deposits and loans must be analyzed. For 
branches that are located at scales less than optimum for reasons discussed 
above, cost-reducing technologies should be developed to lower branch 
transaction costs over time. Special attention must be given to the information 
demands placed on banks, the costs these demands imply, and the value of such 
information if it makes little contribution to more efficient banking. 
6. Interest margins must be adjusted so that the transaction costs of rural branches 
are covered by income. Interest rate levels should be determined by building 
from the bottom up, i.e. establish deposit rates which provide incentives to 
depositors, then add an interest margin sufficient to cover bank costs .and risk 
premium. 
7. Expanding financial services in rural Bangladesh requires a balancing of bank 
and customer incurred transaction costs. The importance of number of bank 
branches for deposit mobilization by reducing transaction costs for depositors is 
discussed in Meyer, Khalily and Hushak. Low borrower and depositor 
transaction costs imply a large number of widely distributed branches. 
Additional analysis is needed to detemrlne if the current number and geographic 
distribution of branches is appropriate to simultaneously meet the objective of 
reduced customer transaction costs and increased bank efficiency. There may 
be important trade-offs so that rural customers will gladly pay higher costs for 
bank services because the branch is small, but is located nearby. 
8. Finally, the cost structures obtained under the production and intermediation 
approach have important policy implications. The intennediation approach 
focused on the weakness of the rural banking system to sustain itself. Rural 
branches have become little more than retail lending operations, relying on 
rediscount funds. The production approach suggests that expansion is 
economically viable only if rural branches function as true financial 
intennediaries, providing both lending and deposit mobilization services. 
• 
• 
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Table 1 
Agricultural Credit: Sources of Funds, 1975 - 1987. 
YearW Total Dis- Total Re- Net Refi- RID NR/D Other 
bursement coveryDI nanc~ SourcessY 
(D) (R) (NR) 
(Millions of Takas) (Percent) 
1975 377 367 -47 97 -13 15 
1976 461 496 -48 108 -11 3 
1977 864 571 132 66 15 19 
1978 1,569 936 322 60 21 20 
1979 1,632 1,160 361 . 71 22 7 
1980 2,821 1,475 1,032 52 37 11 
1981 3,734 2,214 699 59 19 22 
1982 4,238 3,143 667 74 16 10 
1983 6,786 3,423 2,866 51 42 7 
1984 10,053 5,176 2,574 52 26 23 
1985 11,498 5,839 4,739 51 41 8 
1986 6,317 6,072 -317 96 -5 9 
1987 6,512 11,068 -1,691 170 -26 -44 
w As of June 30 of the year. 
.bl Includes principal and interest g Net Refinance from Bangladesh Bank. 
di Note that this column is a residual value. 
Source: Ahmed, Zia, Rural Banking in Bangladesh: A Brief Review, 1987 . 
.. 
Table 2 
Mean Values for the Cost Function Variables !I 
BANK 
VARIABLE 
AG RANI JANATA RUPALI SON ALI BKB 
Total Cost91 (TK) 1,055,278 757,888 849,640 802,026 1,149,764 
Operating Cost (TK) 550,860 328,958 461,806 261,244 239,982 
Interest Expense 270,642 319,726 387,834 540,782£1 89,692 
(Deposits) (TK) 
Interest Expense 233,776 109,204 39,188 - 820,090 
(Borrowed Funds)d/ (TK) 
Price of Labor (TK/employee) 19,840 12,186 15,892 12,118 16,226 
Price of Capital (TK)»' 0.0024 0.0036 0.0016 0.0038 0.0012 
Labor Share 0.72 0.73 0.80 0.77 0.81 
Capital Share 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.07 
Deposits (TK) 4,565,000 5,308,674 6,003,013 6,455,717 1,417,470 
Loans Outstanding (TK) 3,924,740 3,557,767 3,030,026 6,054,897 12,390,417 
Average Deposit Size (TK) 2,080 2,450 2,893 2,988 1,000 
Average Loan Size (TK) 4,490 3,496 3,773 3,280 3,832 
Number of Branches 40 43 19 46 42 
JI Average for the pooled sample, 1983 and 1984. 
91 Total Cost= Operating Cost+ Interest Expense (Deposits)+ Interest Expense (Borrowed Funds). 
£1 Total Interest Expense. 
<JI Borrowed Funds include transfer of deposits from surplus tO deficit branches as well as refinance funds. 
r;J Capital costs per taka of total deposits and loans. 
...... 
CX> 
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Table 3 
Economies of Scale and Elasticity of Cost With Respect to Output 
BANK 
COST CONCEPT 
AG RANI JANATA RUPALI SON ALI BKB 
(A) PRODUCTION APPROACH 
1. Small BranchN 
Economies of Scale 0.91 0.75* 0.88 0.76* 0.66* 
Elasticity of Cost wrt Output 
Deposits 0.44* 0.38* 0.57* 0.31* 0.14* 
Loans 0.47* 0.36* 0.31 * 0.45* 0.52* 
2. Overall Mean.bl 
Economies of Scale 0.90 0.82* 0.94 0.77* 0.68* 
Elasticity of Cost wrt Output 
Deposits 0.49* 0.46* 0.64* 0.36* 0.15* 
Loans 0.41* 0.36* 0.30* 0.41* 0.53* 
3. Large Branch.kl 
Economies of Scale 1.14 0.84** 1.02 0.83* 0.73* 
Elasticity of Cost wrt Output 
Deposits 0.56* 0.53* 0.72t 0.39* 0.19* 
Loans 0.58* 0.32* 0.30* 0.44* 0.54* 
(B) INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
1. Small Branch 
Economies of Scale 1.07 0.83* 0.97 0.88* 1.68* 
Elasticity of Cost wrt Output 
Deposits 0.49* 0.39* 0.54* 0.16* 0.11 • 
Loans 0.58* 0.44* 0.43* 0.71* 1.57* 
2. Overall Mean 
Economies of Scale 1.26* 1.15* 1.16** 1.20· 1.66* 
Elasticity of Cost wrt Output 
Deposits 0.68* 0.59* 0.73* 0.44* 0.11 • 
Loans 0.58* 0.56* 0.44* 0.76* 1.55* 
3. Large Branch 
Economies of Scale 1.70* 1.38* 1.30* 1.49* 1.56* 
Elasticity of Cost wrt Output 
Deposits 0.87** 0.74* 0.83 0.56* 0.08* 
Loans 0.83* 0.64* 0.47* 0.93 1.48* 
• Indicates significantly different from one at the 1 percent level. 
•• Indicates significantly different from one at the S percent level. 
t Indicates significantly different from one at the 10 percent level. 
al Evaluated at deposit size class of Tk 200,000 - 400,000. 
bl Evaluated at the geometric means of the variables in the models. 
g Evaluated at deposit size class of Tk 2,000,000 - 3,000,000. 
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Table 4 
Cost of Lending, Deposit Mobilization, Overall Intermediation Costs 
and Scope Economies 
BANK 
COST CONCEPT!! 
AG RANI JANATA RUPALI SON ALI BKB 
(A) PRODUCTION APPROACH 
1. Share of Deposits in total costs 54.74% 56.04% 68.14% 47.14% 21.37% 
2. Share of Loans in total costs 45.26% 43.96% 31.86% 52.86% 78.63% 
C2sts Qf M2bilizin~ De122sits 
3. Average Costs 1.59% 1.44% 1.90% 1.09% 0.63% 
4. Marginal Costs 0.78% 0.67% 1.21% 0.40% 0.09% 
C2sts Qf ~ndin~ 
5. Average Costs 6.49% 5.49% 6.53% 2.34% 1.06% 
6. Marginal Costs 2.65% 1.99% 1.95% 0.95% 0.55% 
Overall Intennediati.QD C2st 
7. Average Costs 8.08% 6.93% 8.43% 3.43% 1.69% 
8. Marginal Costs 3.43% 2.66% 3.17% 1.35% 0.64% 
9. Economies of Scopel21 -0.43 0.39 0.01 -0.15 0.21 
(B) INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
1. Share of Deposits in total costs 54.45% 50.10% 62.61% 36.37% 6.57% 
2. Share of Loans in total costs 45.55% 49.90% 37.39% 63.63% 93.43% 
Cs.ists Qf M2biliz;in~ De122sits 
3. Average Costs 6.67% 6.53% 4.73% 2.68% 2.87% 
4. Marginal Costs 4.56% 3.61% 3.45% 1.17% 0.31% 
C2sts Qf L~m:lin ~ 
5. Average Costs 9.13% 10.23% 7.80% 5.67% 4.30% 
6. Marginal Costs 5.22% 5.63% 3.40% 4.32% 6.67% 
Overall IntennediatiQll Cost 
7. Average Costs 15.80% 16.76% 12.53% 8.35% 7.17% 
8. Marginal Costs 9.78% 9.24% 6.85% 5.49% 6.99% 
9. Economies of Scope -0.84 -0.33 -0.75 -0.51 0.24 
!I Evaluated at the geometric means of the variables in the models. 
121 Evaluated at 10 percent of the sample mean. 
Table 5 
Official Agricultural Loan Recovery Position by Bank and by Year* 
Year 
Bank 1918n9 1919180 1980181 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86** 
(Percent) 
Agrani 41 30 27 28 34 37 37 21 
Janata 53 32 35 39 43 33 32 22 
Rupali 25 23 15 34 10 25 17 13 
Sonali 48 36 38 31 . 37 39 32 20 
BKB 54 56 68 68 50 50 44 32 
Total 45 42 49 48 42 42 38 25 
* Recovery is measured as loan payments received (LR) during a given period as a percent of 
loans due during that period (LO) plus previous overdues (LPD). Symbolically this percentage 
would be LR/(LD+LPD). 
** The 1985/86 figures are only up to April 1986. 
Source: Gregory and Adams. 
• 
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Figure 1 
Loan Recovery Profile for Short-Term 
Agricultural Loans Made in 1979-1984: 
Percent of Principal Recovered 
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